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Abstract
Everett’s interpretation of quantum mechanics was proposed to
avoid problems inherent in the prevailing interpretational frame. It
assumes that quantum mechanics can be applied to any system and
that the state vector always evolves unitarily. It then claims that
whenever an observable is measured, all possible results of the mea-
surement exist. This notion of multiplicity has been understood in
different ways by proponents of Everett’s theory. In fact the spec-
trum of opinions on various ontological questions raised by Everett’s
approach is rather large, as we attempt to document in this critical
review. We conclude that much remains to be done to clarify and
specify Everett’s approach.
KEY WORDS: Everett, many worlds, multiplicity, quantum mechanics,
interpretation.
1 Introduction
Everett’s ‘relative state formulation of quantum mechanics’ (1957a), also
known as ‘the many-worlds interpretation,’ was proposed almost sixty years
ago. It remained little more than a curiosity for a couple of decades, but has
from then on attracted sustained attention. Its current status was synthe-
sized and criticized in the remarkable recent monograph by Saunders et al.
(2010), while Byrne (2010) uncovered at the same time the fascinating story
of its genesis.
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Everett’s original motivation was to provide a formulation of quantum
mechanics that would avoid problems inherent in the then current interpre-
tational frame, which drew both from the Copenhagen distinction between
the quantum and the classical and from the Dirac–von Neumann collapse of
the state vector. The main problem comes in so-called measurement situa-
tions which, in view of later discussions, we presently formulate on a specific
example.
Let |a1〉 and |a2〉 be an orthonormal basis of a two-dimensional Hilbert
space, associated for instance with a spin-1
2
particle. Let an apparatus be
designed so as to measure an observable Σz given by
Σz = |a1〉〈a1| − |a2〉〈a2|. (1)
Matrix elements of Σz in the above basis are given by the Pauli matrix
denoted by σz.
Let |α0〉 denote the normalized initial state of the apparatus. In a nonde-
structive measurement, the interaction between the particle and apparatus
is assumed to be effected by a unitary operator such that
|a1〉|α0〉 → |a1〉|α1〉, |a2〉|α0〉 → |a2〉|α2〉, (2)
where the arrow symbolizes time evolution and |α1〉 and |α2〉 are orthogonal
pointer states. Let c1 and c2 be complex coefficients (satisfying |c1|2+|c2|2 = 1
for normalization). Because the unitary evolution is linear, we must have
(c1|a1〉+ c2|a2〉)|α0〉 → c1|a1〉|α1〉+ c2|a2〉|α2〉. (3)
Thus the interaction has transformed an initial product state into a final
entangled state.
If we look carefully at the right-hand side of (3), we see that the apparatus
finds itself in a superposition of different pointer states. This is highly coun-
terintuitive. It doesn’t help to introduce an observer O to read the pointer
and evolve from a normalized state |O0〉 to a state |O1〉 if he reads α1, or to
a state |O2〉 if he reads α2. For if O is treated quantum-mechanically, the
combined particle-apparatus-observer system evolves as
(c1|a1〉+ c2|a2〉)|α0〉|O0〉 → (c1|a1〉|α1〉+ c2|a2〉|α2〉)|O0〉
→ c1|a1〉|α1〉|O1〉+ c2|a2〉|α2〉|O2〉. (4)
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At the end of the process, the observer therefore finds himself in a superpo-
sition.
The Copenhagen solution of the measurement problem consists essentially
in pointing out that an apparatus is necessarily classical, and therefore cannot
be a quantum system as hypothesized before (2). The upshot is that the
apparatus registers either α1 or α2, but not both. Copenhagen adherents
bear the burden of precisely specifying where the quantum-classical boundary
lies.1
The Dirac–von Neumann solution of the measurement problem consists
in introducing a break in the unitary evolution of the state vector. It doesn’t
matter whether the break occurs after the system-apparatus coupling or after
the system-apparatus-observer coupling. In the former case for instance, the
break occurs as
c1|a1〉|α1〉+ c2|a2〉|α2〉
→ |c1|2(|a1〉〈a1|)(|α1〉〈α1|) + |c2|2(|a2〉〈a2|)(|α2〉〈α2|). (5)
The right-hand side of (5) represents a proper mixture where the pointer
shows α1 with probability |c1|2 and α2 with probability |c2|2. Von Neumann
(1955) called the break Process 1 (the collapse of the state vector), con-
trasting it with Process 2, the unitary Schro¨dinger evolution. Proponents
of collapse bear the burden of precisely specifying how and in what circum-
stances Process 1 occurs.
Everett’s proposal was to take (3) and (4) at face value. This means that,
in some sense, all outcomes of a measurement have the same ontological sta-
tus. The resulting interpretation of quantum mechanics would not require
the presence of a classical apparatus or observer external to a quantum sys-
tem. Quantum mechanics could therefore, in principle, be applied to the
whole universe. Moreover, the theory would not require an explicit collapse
of the state vector. The state vector would only evolve through Process 2,
that is, through Schro¨dinger’s unitary evolution.
I have argued elsewhere (Marchildon, 2011) that the most important
problem related to Everett’s work is the understanding of multiplicity.2 It is
1Or, they have to live with the fact that an apparatus behaves classically if it performs
a measurement, and quantum-mechanically if it is itself measured by a super apparatus.
2This assessment is not consensual. See for instance the extensive discussion of proba-
bility in Saunders et al. (2010). Schwindt (2012) argues that the preferred-basis problem
has a component which is not solved by decoherence, while Baker (2007) correspondingly
emphasizes how probability, decoherence and the preferred basis are interconnected.
3
clear that for Everett, all possible results of a quantum experiment exist. In
what sense they do exist, however, was not made precise in Everett’s pub-
lished work. Perhaps the closest he comes to specifying this is found in the
following quote (Everett, 1957a, p. 459):3
We thus arrive at the following picture: Throughout all of a se-
quence of observation processes there is only one physical system
representing the observer, yet there is no single unique state of
the observer (which follows from the representations of interact-
ing systems). Nevertheless, there is a representation in terms of a
superposition, each element of which contains a definite observer
state and a corresponding system state. Thus with each succeed-
ing observation (or interaction), the observer state ‘branches’ into
a number of different states. Each branch represents a different
outcome of the measurement and the corresponding eigenstate
for the object-system state. All branches exist simultaneously in
the superposition after any given sequence of observations.
Its title notwithstanding, this paper does not aim at carefully reconstruct-
ing the thread of Hugh Everett III’s views on multiplicity from all available
published and unpublished sources, something on which substantial progress
has been achieved in recent years.4 The purpose of the paper is to provide
a fairly exhaustive review of the ways people have tried in subsequent years
to understand multiplicity in Everett’s framework.5 They can be broadly di-
vided into three groups: many worlds, many minds, and decoherent sectors
of the wave function. We shall see that these approaches further subdivide,
and that they all raise important questions that have not been completely
answered. We shall not presume to make any final assessment on Everett’s
program, but we shall conclude at least that there is still much to be clarified
and specified in it.
3Unless specified otherwise, emphasis is always in the original.
4See for instance Osnaghi et al. (2009), Byrne (2010), Barrett (2011), Barrett and
Byrne (2012) and Barrett (2014).
5Inevitably, there is some overlap between this paper and Barrett (1999). But Barrett’s
excellent review of Everett’s approach is now more than 15 years old. Earlier syntheses
can be found in Whitaker (1985) and Kent (1990). The former is concerned with the
relation between Everett’s approach and the EPR problem. The latter is an influential
critique of many-worlds interpretations, aimed mainly at the probability and preferred-
basis problems.
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2 Many worlds
The phrase ‘many worlds’ evokes the genuine existence of a great number of
more or less similar copies of the world we live in. The idea that the world
literally splits into a number of (initially) slightly different real copies of itself
was popularized by DeWitt. Indeed (DeWitt, 1970, p. 33):
This universe is constantly splitting into a stupendous number
of branches, all resulting from the measurementlike interactions
between its myriads of components. Moreover, every quantum
transition taking place on every star, in every galaxy, in every
remote corner of the universe is splitting our local world on earth
into myriads of copies of itself [...] I still recall vividly the shock
I experienced on first encountering this multiworld concept. The
idea of 10100+ slightly imperfect copies of oneself all constantly
splitting into further copies, which ultimately become unrecog-
nizable, is not easy to reconcile with common sense.
According to this quote, the split occurs at the atomic, that is, at the
microscopic level. Every time an interaction produces entanglement, whether
or not macroscopic objects are involved, a split presumably occurs. This goes
beyond what we find in Everett, at least in print. There are good indications
(Byrne, 2010; Bell, 1976, p. 95; Deutsch, 1996, p. 223) that Everett, just like
DeWitt, had in mind a genuine split.6 Unlike DeWitt, however, he applied
it only in contexts where there is an interaction involving something like
a macroscopic apparatus. Moreover, he proposed rather specific conditions
under which measurements occur (Everett, 1957b, pp. 10, 53, 55):
[A]ll measurement and observation processes are to be regarded
simply as interactions between observer and object-system which
produce strong correlations.
[A] measurement is simply a special case of interaction between
physical systems—an interaction which has the property of cor-
relating a quantity in one subsystem with a quantity in another.
6But Osnaghi et al. (2009, p. 107) note that throughout Everett’s writings, the terms
‘real,’ ‘reality,’ ‘actual,’ ‘branching process’ and ‘branches’ appear systematically in quotes.
In an analysis of Everett’s attitude towards ‘worlds,’ Barrett (2011, p. 286) points out that
“Everett believed that his theory neither required nor supported any special metaphysical
commitments.” See also Zeh (2014).
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We shall therefore accept the following definition. An interaction
H is a measurement of A in S1 by B in S2 if H does not destroy
the marginal information of A (equivalently: if H does not disturb
the eigenstates of A in the above sense) and if furthermore the
correlation {A,B} increases toward its maximum [. . . ] with time.
In other words, a measurement transforms a product state of a quantum sys-
tem and an apparatus into a maximally-entangled state, in a nondestructive
way (i.e. system eigenstates are left invariant).
Already at this stage, we are confronted with two different views of split-
ting, which give rise to two questions:
1. Does the split occur with all microscopic entanglement-producing in-
teraction, or only in macroscopic measurementlike contexts?
2. Does the split occur in every possible basis in which the entangled state
can be expressed, or just in one basis?
With respect to the second question, it seems that it would be impossible
to recover appearances if a genuine split occurred along any basis. This would
mean real worlds with macroscopic apparatus, and even human observers,
in quantum superpositions. We will see, however, that such a conclusion
may not hold in other interpretations of Everett’s theory. Butterfield (1995,
p. 133) pointed out that branching along arbitrary bases may be coherent,
but it presumably implies sacrificing natural meshing conditions between
the branches of different quantities, in order to avoid no hidden variable
theorems.
So it seems that with a genuine split, there must be some preferred basis.
Ballantine (1973) pointed out that if the split occurs at the atomic level, there
is no natural definition of a branching representation. Note that it doesn’t
help to propose that branching occurs along states that are left invariant by
the interaction, like |a1〉 and |a2〉 in (2). For this nondestructive interaction is
very special, and one can easily contemplate entanglement-producing interac-
tions that leave no states invariant. If the split only occurs at a macroscopic
level, decoherence no doubt helps in selecting a preferred basis. But follow-
ing Bell, Everett can be criticized for not making the concept of instrument
reading precise (Bell, 1976, pp. 96–97):
[I]f instrument readings are to be given such a fundamental role
should we not be told more exactly what an instrument reading
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is [. . . ] [F]undamental physical theory should be so formulated
that such artificial divisions are manifestly inessential.
We see that if the split occurs only with macroscopic apparatus, the problem
of specifying what an apparatus is looks very much like the problem of clar-
ifying the classical-quantum distinction in the Copenhagen interpretation.
Vaidman (1998, p. 251) envisions a microscopic split in connection with
neutron interferometry: “My proposal is that during the period of time the
neutron wave function is inside the interferometer there are two neutron
worlds [.]” But we will see later that he proposes rather robust conditions
for a macroscopic split. Bell (1986, p. 193) had summarized the ambiguity
between microscopic and macroscopic split in the following way: “One is
given no idea of how far down towards the atomic scale the splitting of the
world into branch worlds penetrates.”
There are several distinct ways to view splitting, even if it is restricted to
occur in connection with macroscopic events only.
Healey (1984) considers that splitting occurs upon a measurementlike
interaction. According to him, the simplest way to view splitting (say, into n
copies) is that every elementary system splits into n copies, in usual ordinary
space. But this, for Healey, is hardly defensible, for mass-energy would also
be multiplied and we would presumably be aware of the overcrowding of
space. Accordingly, the split he introduces can become acceptable in two
different ways:
1. The physical systems do not split, only their states do.
2. Not only systems, but space itself splits. The resulting systems may be
viewed as living in a higher-dimensional space.
Healey develops the first way into lines that anticipate what we shall elab-
orate in Sect. 4. With respect to the second way, he claims (pp. 598–599)
that
within the framework of ordinary non-relativistic quantum me-
chanics, a version of the many-worlds interpretation according to
which space and its constituent quantum systems split on quan-
tum measurement offers no interpretative advantages over a ver-
sion in which the actual outcome of a measurement is only one
of many possible states of the world in space.
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Healy then analyses the actual one-world version he has in mind. It turns out
to be related to modal interpretations (Vermaas, 1999) and to share some of
their problems. Note that in the context of genuine splitting, the relevance
of retaining many worlds has often been questioned. Indeed (Kent, 2012,
p. 423):
As Bell [. . . ] and (probably many) others [. . . ] have noted, if
the branching of worlds were precisely and objectively defined,
a many worlds interpretation would seem unnecessarily extrava-
gant. Given a precisely defined branching structure, we can just
as easily define a one world interpretation of quantum theory.
Several investigators have proposed reasonably specific definitions of what
should be counted as a world. Vaidman (2014) clearly commits to a definition
along macroscopic lines. He proposes that the quantum state of a world is
given by
|Ψworld〉 = |Ψ〉object 1|Ψ〉object 2 . . . |Ψ〉objectN |Φ〉, (6)
where each ‘object’ is macroscopic and |Φ〉 represents the quantum state of
all the particles that do not constitute objects. In the 2002 version of the
same Encyclopedia article, he also considered the possibility that only the
object states directly perceived by sentient beings appear in (6), with |Φ〉
representing everything else.
Butterfield (1995) had a similar representation, where the |Ψ〉object i are
decohering states of macroscopic objects and |Φ〉 is the overall relative state.
Discussing how splitting and multiplicity (or ‘plurality’) can apply to branches,
he concludes that decoherence removes the need of physical splitting. In
Butterfield (2001), formally similar definitions of worlds are used both for
many-worlds and decoherence approaches.
Graham (1973) interprets Everett’s as a world-splitting theory, where
there is one world corresponding to each possible result of a measurement.
In an attempt to recover the Born rule from Everett’s approach, he applies the
split to an observer reading a macroscopic apparatus intended to measure the
relative frequency operator on a collection of identically prepared systems. It
is not clear if the split also applies to a single measurement of a microscopic
observable.
Here again, precision in definitions may reduce the appeal of a many-
worlds approach. Indeed (Barrett, 1999, p. 157):
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DeWitt and Graham’s world-splitting rule tells us that worlds
split whenever a measurement-like interaction occurs, but they
never explain precisely what counts as a measurement-like inter-
action; rather, this is determined by one’s choice of a preferred
basis in the theory, which is never made explicit. But note that
if we did know what it took to count as a measurement-like in-
teraction here, then one would be able to solve the measurement
problem in the standard collapse theory by stipulating that the
global wave function collapses whenever precisely that sort of in-
teraction occurs.
The next important question that comes up with genuine splitting is
whether the split is irreversible or, equivalently, whether each branch hence-
forth evolves completely independently from the others. In a collective reply
to DeWitt (1970), Gerver points out (Ballantine et al., 1971, p. 40) that
if it is possible for the universe to split into two slightly different
realities by a quantum-mechanical event, then surely it is equally
possible for two slightly different universes to become identical in
the same manner.
DeWitt (1970, p. 35) also believes that in principle the split can be undone,
“by bringing the apparatus packets back together again.” Although Everett
(1957b, p. 97) speaks of “an essential irreversibility to Process 1,” that irre-
versibility is only apparent within a theory “which recognizes only Process 2”
(p. 98). As Barrett (2014) points out, branches are real for Everett because
they are always in principle detectable (Everett 1957b, p. 107):
It is therefore improper to attribute any less validity or ‘reality’
to any element of a superposition than any other element, due
to [the] ever present possibility of obtaining interference effects
between the elements. All elements of a superposition must be
regarded as simultaneously existing.
It should be pointed out that undoing the split would involve a rather
peculiar process, even if we admit that splitting occurs in purely microscopic
interactions. Suppose that a split has occurred after interaction (3), where
|α1〉 and |α2〉 represent microscopic states. For a time both terms on the
right-hand side of (3) are different worlds. Now it may happen that |α1〉
evolves into |α0〉 in world 1, while |α2〉 evolves into |α0〉 in world 2, with |a1〉
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and |a2〉 unchanged. Then the global state would revert to the left-hand side
of (3). At that moment, world 1 and world 2 would unsplit, or recombine
into just one world. Zeh (1970) points out that someone in a given branch
cannot estimate the probability of inverse branching.
Several authors have pointed out that splitting into completely indepen-
dent worlds is incompatible with Schro¨dinger dynamics:
Apparent collapse has also been described as ‘world-splitting,’
and, as several authors have warned [. . . ] it is tempting to take
world-splitting as a physical process and thus effectively return
to the Copenhagen interpretation. (Donald, 1995, p. 532)
If one supposes that the state of a world determines the behaviour
of physical systems in that world in so far as their behaviour is
determined, then the splitting-worlds theory is incompatible with
the usual linear dynamics[.] (Barrett, 1999, p. 160)
A similar conclusion can be drawn from Albert and Barrett (1995), who
consider the measurement of an observable pertaining to an apparatus that
has already made a spin measurement.7
The difficult problem of recombination can, however, be avoided. Deutsch
(1985) suggests that there are infinitely many worlds (he calls them ‘uni-
verses’) at any time. Their number neither increases nor decreases. In mea-
surement contexts the set of all worlds is partitioned in as many branches as
there are possible measurement results, the measure of worlds in each branch
corresponding to the probability of the associated observable value. Thus we
have bifurcation instead of splitting.8 To the measured observable Deutsch
attempts to associate an interpretation basis in the Hilbert space, within the
quantum formalism. Deutsch claims that the probabilistic interpretation is
now truly built in, although Butterfield (2001) argues that it is difficult to
make sense of probability in Deutsch’s approach.
Note that bifurcation avoids a problem that several people see with split-
ting, namely, a dramatic increase in mass-energy, in violation with the known
conservation laws. No such thing can happen if the number of worlds does
not change.
7Different objections to Everett branching can be found in Gauthier (1983) and Jeknic´-
Dugic´ et al. (2014).
8A similar view has been developed within the approach to Everett that we investigate
in Sect. 4. See Saunders (2010) and Wilson (2011). Branches that coincide in the past are
said to ‘overlap,’ whereas they ‘diverge’ if in the past they are only qualitatively identical.
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A continuous infinity of worlds is also postulated by Bostro¨m (2012), who
tries to combine the approaches of Everett and Bohm. Bostro¨m considers the
configuration space of N pointlike particles and associates, at a given time, a
distinct world with each configuration. However, he identifies worlds which
differ only by the permutation of two identical particles. Note that many
worlds along Bohmian lines were also considered by Bell (1976, 1981), Tipler
(2006) and Valentini (2010). Bostro¨m attempts to answer the criticism that
multiplicity in this case is entirely artificial. He further develops his ideas in
Bostro¨m (2015).
In perspicuous early analyses of Everett’s approach, Bell suggested that
the real novel element in Everett’s theory is the repudiation of the concept
of past:
Everett [...] tries to associate each particular branch at the present
time with some particular branch at any past time in a tree-like
structure, in such a way that each representative of an observer
has actually lived through the particular past that he remembers.
[This] attempt does not succeed [. . . ] and is in any case against
the spirit of Everett’s emphasis on memory contents as the im-
portant thing. We have no access to the past, but only to present
memories. (1976, p. 95)
Keeping the instantaneous configurations, but discarding the tra-
jectory, is the essential (in my opinion) of the theory of Everett.
(1981, p. 133)
Butterfield (1995) also argues that the absence of history tends to support
plurality.
If splitting into many worlds is a physical process, several specific ques-
tions arise. Thus Lockwood (1989, p. 226) asks “at what point in the von
Neumann chain does the split or decomposition occur, and on what spacelike
surface?” Tipler (1986, p. 206) had partly answered the second query:
[M]any presentations of the MWI [many-worlds interpretation]
have made it appear more counter-intuitive than it really is. For
example, many accounts assert that “the entire universe is split
by a measurement.” This is not true. Only the observed/observer
system splits; only that restricted portion of the universe acted
on [by] the measurement operator M splits.
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It is not clear where the two physical instances of the apparatus sit if the
rest of the universe is not split.
Squires (1988, p. 16) raises the question “what can ‘splitting’ possibly
mean in this context—what moves away from what?—and in what ‘space’?”
To such interrogations, Tappenden (2000, p. 113) replies:
This all suggests that what is involved in unpacking Everett’s
proposal is the addition of a further dimensionality to standard
four-dimensional spacetime[.]
But Vaidman (2014) claims that the worlds of the many-worlds interpretation
“exist in parallel at the same space and time as our own.” We will come back
to this in Sect. 4.
In an early discussion of Everett’s and DeWitt’s ideas, Smolin (1984) first
introduced what he calls the “minimal relative state interpretation” (MRS).
In the MRS, the right-hand side of (3) is not interpreted as the actual state
of the composite system, but as the list of contingent statements like ‘If the
apparatus reads α1, then the quantum system’s observable Σz has value +1.’
Smolin then shows that the MRS has several of the advantages that the full-
fledged MWI has. In the MWI, the right-hand side of (3) represents the
actual, objective state of affairs of the composite system, where all outcomes
are actual (p. 445):
[I]f we wish to regard our having observed a particular ai to be
the outcome of the experiment as an actual event in the world
then it follows that we must also regard our having observed each
of the other possibilities as also being actual events in the world.
But Smolin also expresses caution about splitting (pp. 447–448):
One usually introduces at this point in the discussion the expres-
sion that the different statements are all true, but each is true
of a different ‘branch’ of the wavefunction [. . . ] The disadvantage
of using the language of branches is that it suggests that some
kind of dynamical mechanism is taking place, in addition to the
evolution of the wavefunction, in which, as time goes on and ini-
tially isolated systems come together and interact, the universe
is ‘splitting’ into more and more ‘branches.’
This makes it more difficult to understand what Smolin has in mind with the
actuality of all outcomes, unless it is interpreted as in the next sections.
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3 Many minds
The first full-fledged formulation of the idea that the split involves the mind
rather than the world seems to be the one of Albert and Loewer (1988). Yet
some passages in Everett’s published work can be construed in that way. For
instance we read (Everett, 1957b, p. 10) that
after the interaction has taken place there will not, generally, exist
a single observer state. There will, however, be a superposition
of the composite system states, each element of which contains a
definite observer state and a definite relative object-system state
[...] Thus, each element of the resulting superposition describes an
observer who perceived a definite and generally different result,
and to whom it appears that the object-system state has been
transformed into the corresponding eigenstate. In this sense the
usual assertions of Process 1 appear to hold on a subjective level
to each observer described by an element of the superposition.
Cooper and Van Vechten (1969, pp. 1217–1218), who point out the sim-
ilarity of their views to Everett’s, come rather close to the idea of many
minds:
[O]ur knowledge that our own mind is in some state need not
be reflected in the wave function. Rather, it is expressed in the
way we pose the question. That a system is in the state U is
equivalent to the statement that all coupled ‘good’ systems and
sane minds will agree that the system is in the state U [. . . ] The
wave function may contain a superposition of U and L but there is
no manifestation of this to anyone—including the mind described
by the wave function—unless interference can occur.
Zeh (1970, 1981) anticipates the many-minds view, and attributes the
idea to Everett. Healey (1984) also suggests that Everett can be understood
along that way, while the general idea is further anticipated in Albert (1986)
and Squires (1987, 1988, 1991).
Albert and Loewer motivate their introduction of many minds by listing
three problems with the splitting-worlds view: (i) the fact that, as they
see it, it entails the nonconservation of mass-energy; (ii) the difficulty to
understand probability within a deterministic theory; and (iii) the choice of
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a preferred basis. They then point out that if the Schro¨dinger equation is
always valid, the brain states of an observer, in a measurement context, can
evolve into a superposition. Belief states, however, are never superposed, for
an observer never believes he is in a superposition of seeing |α1〉 and seeing
|α2〉. Therefore, belief states cannot be wholly physical. Albert and Loewer
thus commit themselves to some form of dualism.
Albert and Loewer then introduce minds in two different ways, the latter
being their favorite. In the single-mind view (SMV), each observer has one
mind. The state vector after measurement is given by (4), but the observer’s
mind is associated either with O1 or (exclusive) with O2, with probabilities
|c1|2 and |c2|2 respectively. Albert and Loewer point out that the nonphysi-
calism in this case is rather acute, for mind states do not even supervene on
physical states. Moreover, the SMV gives rise to what has become known
as the mindless-hulk problem (Albert, 1992). This consists in the fact that
after the split, all brain states but one are mindless. Thus in EPR contexts,
Alice’s single mind and Bob’s single mind can end up in different branches,
unless there are strong nonlocal correlations between minds.
In the many-minds view (MMV), every observer has associated with it an
infinite set of minds. In (4), a fraction |c1|2 of minds become associated with
O1 and a fraction |c2|2 with O2. Minds are associated with brain states but are
not subject to superposition. In spite of this nonphysicalism, mental states
are supervenient on brain states. Although the time evolution of each mind
is probabilistic, the time evolution of the set of all minds is deterministic.
Albert and Loewer claim that the many-minds view is local. Although they
do not fully commit to it, they favor the transtemporal identity of individual
minds. Since the transtemporal identity of individual minds has no ground in
physical facts, this makes up for a definitely dualistic view. Saunders (1996b)
notes that there is no mindless hulk problem if the transtemporal identity of
minds is rejected.
Barrett (1995) rehabilitates the SMV, provided the mental dynamics is
suitably constrained by the linear physical dynamics.
Squires (1988) also proposed what amounts to the SMV. Later Squires
(1991, p. 285) introduced a concept of universal consciousness, to avoid the
mindless hulk problem (although he didn’t use the term):
The obvious way of satisfying this requirement [that the choices
made by Jack’s and Jill’s conscious minds be correlated] is to
assume some sort of universality of consciousness so that when,
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for example, Jack’s conscious mind is aware of the result, then
‘Conscious Mind’ is also aware of it [...] The [alternative] idea [...]
is that, associated with Jack’s brain, there are an infinite number
of conscious minds.
Another advocate of many minds is Lockwood, who first presented his
views soon after Albert and Loewer (Lockwood, 1989, p. 226):
According to the relative state view, there is no collapse (or de-
composition) of the wave function, individual or multiple. Rather
than say that, on the relative state view, the observer splits the
universe by carrying out a measurement, it would be closer to the
mark to say that it is the universe that splits the observer.
For Lockwood, multiplicity is associated with higher dimensionality (p. 232):
What I am proposing, following Deutsch, is that we interpret the
mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics in such a way
that the fact of a physical system’s being in a superposition, with
respect to some set of basis vectors, is to be understood as the
system’s having a dimension in addition to those of time and
space.
Lockwood (1996) further developed the many-minds view and neatly sum-
marized it (pp. 170–171):
A many minds theory, as I understand it, is a theory which takes
completely at face value the account which unitary quantum me-
chanics gives of the physical world and its evolution over time.
In particular, it allows that, just as in special relativity there
is a fundamental democracy of Lorentz frames, so in quantum
mechanics there is a fundamental democracy of vector bases in
Hilbert space. In short, it has no truck with the idea that the laws
of physics prescribe an objectively preferred basis. For a many
minds theorist, the appearance of there being a preferred basis,
like the appearance of state vector reduction, is to be regarded
as an illusion. And both illusions can be explained by appealing
to a theory about the way in which conscious mentality relates
to the physical world as unitary quantum mechanics describes
it [. . . ] Finally, a many minds theory, like a many worlds theory,
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supposes that, associated with a sentient being at any given time,
there is a multiplicity of distinct conscious points of view. But
a many minds theory holds that it is these conscious points of
view or ‘minds,’ rather than ‘worlds,’ that are to be conceived as
literally dividing or differentiating over time—or (as is possible in
principle, though unlikely in practice) [. . . ] fusing or converging.
Lockwood’s ideas can be formalized as follows: There is a subsystem of the
brain which he calls ‘Mind’ (capitalized). Within Mind is an infinite number
of minds, and each of them can have only a single ‘maximal experience’ at any
time. In the brain’s Hilbert space is a ‘consciousness basis’ of orthonormal
vectors |φn〉, each one corresponding to a given maximal experience type En.
Let ρ =
∑
i wi|ψi〉〈ψi| be the Mind’s density operator. One can write
|ψi〉 =
∑
n cin|φn〉, and therefore
ρ =
∑
m,n
(∑
i
wicimc
∗
in
)
|φm〉〈φn|. (7)
Lockwood postulates that in ρ, En occurs with weight
∑
iwi|cin|2. He views
that numerical weight as a segment in a direction orthogonal to time. Al-
though he rejects the transporal identity of individual minds, he associates
segments corresponding to an instant t2 with segments at t1 through evolu-
tion of the |φn〉.
According to Lockwood the Mind, in order to have a single maximal
experience, has to be exactly in a |φn〉. If it is described by a slightly different
mixture, it won’t have a slightly different experience, but a small fraction of
minds will rather have vastly different experiences. Note that the existence
of an infinite number of minds defined on a substrate with a finite number of
particles and states (with energy smaller than some value) seems to introduce
a dualistic component in the theory.
Lockwood’s ideas elicited a number of comments. Deutsch (1996, p. 224)
believes that the split goes beyond the mind:
Lockwood’s preference for the term ‘many minds’ over ‘parallel
universes’ risks giving the impression that it is only minds that
are multiple, and not the rest of reality. Nothing could be further
from the truth, or from Lockwood’s theory [. . . ] The distinctive
assertion of many-minds theories is that the universe perceived by
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any one mind is not an objectively separate ‘layer’ of the multi-
verse. It is merely the view of the multiverse from the perspective
of that mind.
On the other hand, Butterfield (1996, p. 202) pointed out the macroscopic
indefiniteness of Lockwood’s view:
[I]t is worth emphasizing [Lockwood’s interpretation’s] radical-
ism: it allows the unobserved macroscopic world to be very in-
definite, even within a branch.
Earlier, Butterfield (1995, p. 151) had already suggested that many minds
“should bite the bullet: the unobserved rock may well not be definite for any
reasonable familiar quantity.” Note that Barrett (1999, p. 210) claims that
“Lockwood’s denial of the transcendental identity of minds [. . . ] makes his
theory empirically incoherent.”
Butterfield (1995, p. 134) points out that the preferred basis indefiniteness
is less of a problem in many minds than in many worlds:
[M]ost advocates [of many worlds] have assumed a notion of appa-
ratus, i.e. a distinguished set of subsystems of the universe, and a
distinguished quantity on such an apparatus, e.g. position of the
apparatus’ pointer. Commentators have often criticized these as-
sumptions as at best imprecise, and at worst question-begging
(at least as part of a solution to the measurement problem) [. . . ]
As we shall see, [many minds] sees itself, with some justice, as
improving on this imprecise answer, in effect by picking out as
definite those quantities on the brain that correspond to percep-
tion of a definite pointer-position.
His view of many minds is rather close to a modal interpretation (1995,
pp. 145–146, 148):
[Many minds] is a proposal for how to pick out the subsystems
of the universe, and the quantities (bases) on them, that are to
define the branches. Roughly speaking, it proposes that the sub-
systems be brains (considered as quantum systems), and that the
quantities be those quantities whose eigenstates are, or underlie,
conscious mental states.
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Then the proposal is: mind or consciousness picks out a factor-
ization of the universe’s state-space (into the state-space of the
brain, and the state-space of the rest of the universe), and then
also picks out a basis on the first factor—the basis of those quan-
tum states that are or underlie conscious mental states. A branch
is defined by an element of the basis, together with the relative
state of the rest of the universe for that element.
Bacciagaluppi (202, p. 109) believes that “the concept of a brain state
corresponding to a definite perception [. . . ] should not be thought of as pro-
viding a ‘global’ preferred basis for the universe, but a set of ‘local’ preferred
bases, one for every observer.”
Page (1996, 1997) proposed an approach related to many minds, which
he calls ‘Sensible Quantum Mechanics’ (SQM). In the spirit of Everett, the
quantum state never collapses in SQM, but there is a multiplicity of conscious
perceptions. Page (1996, p. 585) bases his approach on three axioms:
Quantum World Axiom: The unconscious ‘quantum world’
Q is completely described by an appropriate algebra of opera-
tors and by a suitable state σ (a positive linear functional of the
operators) giving the expectation value 〈O〉 ≡ σ[O] of each oper-
ator O.
Conscious World Axiom: The ‘conscious world’ M , the set
of all perceptions p, has a fundamental measure µ(S) for each
subset S of M .
Quantum-Consciousness Connection: The measure µ(S) for
each set S of conscious perceptions is given by the expectation
value of a corresponding ‘awareness operator’ A(S), a positive-
operator-valued (POV) measure [. . . ], in the state σ of the quan-
tum world:
µ(S) = 〈A(S)〉 ≡ σ[A(S)].
In SQM perceptions are basic, and there is no fundamental way to classify
them into individual persons or minds. Page leaves it open whether percep-
tions, whose measure is determined by the quantum state, in turn affect the
quantum state. He sees his approach closer to Lockwood’s than to Albert
and Loewer’s.
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In a series of papers written over a decade, Donald (1990, 1992, 1995,
1997, 1999) has developed a technically very sophisticated theory of many
minds. It is impossible to summarize it in a few paragraphs, but some con-
sequences on multiplicity can be briefly extracted.
Donald presents his views of many minds as follows (1990, p. 48):
[T]he universe exists in some fundamental state ω. At each time t
each observer o observes the universe, including his own brain, as
being in some quantum state σo,t. Observer o exists in the state
σo,t, which is just as ‘real’ as the state ω. σo,t is determined by the
observations that o has made and, therefore, by the state of his
brain [. . . ] The a priori probability of an observer existing in state
σo,t is determined by ω. It is because these a priori probabilities
are predetermined that the laws of physics and biology appear to
hold in the universe which we observe. According to the many-
worlds theory, there is a huge difference between the world that
we appear to experience (described by a series of states like σo,t)
and the ‘true’ state ω of the universe. For example, in this theory,
‘collapse’ is observer dependent and does not affect ω. Analysing
the appearance of collapse for an observer is one of the major
tasks for the interpreter of quantum theory.
Now one can ask (1990, p. 47), “What sort of quantum state describes
a brain that is processing definite information [. . . ]?” Donald proposes that
the part of the brain relevant to mind can be modeled by a family of switches.
An observed phenomenon is then a pattern of switching in a human brain.
“[M]ind exists as awareness of brain, but [. . . ] it has no direct physical effect.”
(1990, p. 53) However (1992, p. 1133) “the (objective) physical substrate of
consciousness [. . . ] is not just the instantaneous state of a brain but instead
involves the history of that brain.”
In Donald’s approach (1992, p. 1149), “collapse is, one might say, a mis-
take which the observer makes about the state of the world because he is
physically incapable of seeing its true state.” The number of worlds is finite,
but may be different from one observer to the next. Donald’s approach is
formulated so as to be consistent with special relativity and quantum field
theory. In the end (1999, p. 19):
Nothing is ‘real’ except the switching structures of individual ob-
servers (each considered separately), the initial condition ω, the
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underlying quantum field theory, and the objective probabilities
defined by the hypothesis. Out of these ‘elements of reality,’ each
separate observer must construct his experiences and learn to
guess at what his future may bring. This is done by the observer
being aware of his structure as awareness of an ‘observed world’.
How this might be possible is [. . . ] a sophisticated form of the
doctrine that one is aware of the external world entirely through
being aware of the history of one’s own brain.
I should note that there is sometimes little distinction between many
worlds and many minds, as the following quotes from Vaidman (1998, pp. 245,
255, 257–258) illustrate:
The ‘world’ is a subjective concept of a sentient observer.
The basis of the decomposition [. . . ] of the Universe is deter-
mined by the requirement that individual terms |ψi〉 correspond
to sensible worlds. The consciousness of sentient beings who are
attempting to describe the Universe defines this basis.
Every time we encounter a situation in which, according to the
standard approach, collapse must take place, there splitting in
fact takes place; and the ambiguity connected with the stage at
which collapse occurs corresponds to the subjective nature of the
concept of world. While this ambiguity represents a very serious
difficulty of the collapse theories, it is not a serious problem in the
MWI. The collapse as a physical process should not be vaguely
defined, while the vagueness of the concept of a conscious being
is more of an advantage than a problem.
4 Decoherent sectors
When Everett’s theory is construed as representing a genuine split into many
worlds, the split occurs according to a specific decomposition of the total
state vector. That decomposition is taken to coincide with states where the
apparatus pointer, or more generally any macroscopic object, is well defined.
Clearly, nothing in the total state vector singles out such a decomposition.
This is the preferred-basis problem.
It turns out, however, that this problem is considerably attenuated if
dynamics is added to the instantaneous state vector. This is a consequence
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of decoherence theory (Schlosshauer, 2004), whose detailed consideration lies
beyond the scope of this paper. We will nonetheless say a few words about
it, since approaches to Everett discussed in this section make essential use
of it.
Let us for the moment go back to (4) and take O to represent a general
environment instead of a human observer. Let ρ be the reduced density
operator obtained by tracing out the environmental degrees of freedom in
the final state. We then get
ρ = |c1|2(|a1〉〈a1|)(|α1〉〈α1|) + |c2|2(|a2〉〈a2|)(|α2〉〈α2|)
+ c1c
∗
2〈O2|O1〉(|a1〉〈a2|)(|α1〉〈α2|) + c∗1c2〈O1|O2〉(|a2〉〈a1|)(|α2〉〈α1|).
(8)
It has been shown that in a wide variety of models, the environment states
|O1〉 and |O2〉 are nearly orthogonal if |α1〉 and |α2〉 represent macroscopic
states. The off-diagonal terms in ρ therefore vanish for all practical purposes.
The fact that the right-hand side of (8) essentially coincides with the
right-hand side of (5) has sometimes been taken as an implementation of
the Dirac–von Neumann collapse. In a collapse, however, ρ is a so-called
proper mixture, one that represents ignorance of a true state of affairs that
is either (|a1〉〈a1|)(|α1〉〈α1|) or (|a2〉〈a2|)(|α2〉〈α2|). But ρ in (8) represents
an improper mixture, which cannot be interpreted as ignorance.
The theory of decoherence turns out to be an important building block
of an approach to Everett different from many worlds and many minds.9
The first step in that direction was taken by Gell-Mann and Hartle (1990),
whose program “is an attempt at extension, clarification, and completion of
the Everett interpretation.” (p. 430) Gell-Mann and Hartle make use of the
consistent histories formalism. In the end however, they take only one world
to be real.10
In a series of papers published in the 1990s, Saunders (1993, 1995, 1996a,
1996b, 1998) has developed an approach to Everett based on decoherence
theory. Saunders begins by developing an elaborate analogy between quan-
tum mechanics and special relativity.11 He points out that most thinkers
9The relation between this more recent approach and Everett’s own views is analyzed
in Barrett (2011, 2014). Briefly, Everett’s understanding of empirical faithfulness only
requires that the observer and relative record be found in some decomposition of the
state. There is no appeal to a preferred basis or to decoherence considerations.
10See also Seidewitz (2007) and Gell-Mann and Hartle (2012).
11A similar analogy was made in Geroch (1984).
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nowadays view the notion of ‘now,’ or of ‘the present,’ as relational rather
than absolute. Indeed Minkowski’s four-dimensional picture of space-time
leaves no room for identifying something like ‘now,’ or an absolute past or
absolute future. Time is relational: one can say (in a given Lorentz frame for
instance) that an instant t2 is earlier than, simultaneous with or later than
t1, but not that it lies in some absolute past, present or future.
So it is, according to Saunders, with actuality in quantum mechanics.
Actuality is to be viewed as purely relational.
The basic idea of the relational approach is that this is all that
is required at the level of the fundamental equations. What is
‘actual,’ just as what is ‘now,’ are to be understood as facts as
relations. There is nothing more to be put in; neither the ‘flow’
of time, taking us from one ‘now’ to the next, nor the reduction
of state, taking us from one ‘actuality’ to another. (1995, p. 243)
Our approach is of Everett type, qualified as follows: there is a
plurality of ‘observers’ or ‘classical worlds’ (Everett worlds), but
only in the same Pickwickian sense that there exists a plurality
of spacelike hypersurfaces (within a fixed spacetime foliation), a
plurality of ‘nows.’ (1993, p. 1554)
The formalism of quantum mechanics is to be based solely on the univer-
sal quantum state and its unitary evolution determined by some universal
Hamiltonian operator. Suppose that the right-hand side of (4) represents the
universal state at some time t, where |O1〉 and |O2〉 are (nearly) orthogonal
environment states. Then |a1〉|α1〉 is viewed as actual with respect to |O1〉
and |a2〉|α2〉 is actual with respect to |O2〉. Neither the macroscopic pointer
state |α1〉 nor the state |α2〉 are actual in any absolute sense, but both are
actual in a relational sense.
Since no basis is singled out in the universal quantum state, the notion
of actuality is not restricted to macroscopically well-defined states. Indeed
if (4) is written in terms of linear combinations |O′1〉 and |O′2〉 of |O1〉 and
|O1〉, then the state actual relative to |O′1〉, for instance, will be a linear
combination of |a1〉|α1〉 and |a2〉|α2〉.
The fact that organisms like humans perceive macroscopic objects as
definite does not give them any enhanced actuality. “The goal is to define
a sense in which ‘the classical’ can be understood as an anthropocentric
structure within quantum mechanics.” (Saunders, 1993, p. 1560) Indeed
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complex structures are taken to have evolved in the universal state through
something like Darwinian pressure. It is a selective advantage to perceive
definite macroscopic objects, which is why such objects are actual relative to
evolved organisms like humans.
Saunders (1993) also rejects the notion of splitting, no more appropriate
than the one of a ‘now’ containing different times.
Wallace (2002, 2003) follows Saunders in the analogy between quantum
mechanics and special relativity, as well as on decoherence and evolution
favoring the emergence of stable structures. He identifies real structures
with stable patterns in the universal quantum state (2003, p. 91):
My claim is instead that the emergence of a classical world from
quantum mechanics is to be understood in terms of the emergence
from the theory of certain sorts of structures and patterns, and
that this means that we have no need (as well as no hope!) of the
precision which Kent and others here demand.
Going back to (4) once again, there is one apparatus pattern |α0〉 in the
universal quantum state at the beginning of the experiment. Therefore there
is one apparatus. At the end of the experiment, the universal quantum state
contains two distinct apparatus patterns |α1〉 and |α2〉. Therefore there are
now two apparatus. According to Wallace (2003, p. 92), this doesn’t cause
problems because
If A and B are to be ‘live cat’ and ‘dead cat’ then P and Q will be
described by statements about the state vector which (expressed
in a position basis) will concern the wave-function’s amplitude in
vastly separated regions RP and RQ of configuration space, and
there will be no contradiction between these statements.
Just like Saunders, Wallace allows that worlds are imprecisely defined:
The problem given rise to by this abstraction is that there exist
many choices of consistent history space, but if we follow Everett
and keep the state as fundamental there is no problem. Just as
our choice of world-decomposition (i.e. fine-grained basis) is made
for ease of description rather than more fundamental reasons, so
our choice of history space is just made so as to give a convenient
description of the quantum universe. (2002, pp. 648–649)
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Another question which at first sight should have a precise an-
swer: if there was one cat before the measurement and two after
it, when exactly did the duplication of cats occur? [. . . ] Put an-
other way, the cat description is only useful when answering ques-
tions on timescales far longer than [the decoherence timescale] τD,
so whether or not quantum splitting is occurring, it just doesn’t
make sense to ask questions about cats that depend on such short
timescales. (2003, pp. 97–98)
We should point out that the present approach views the evolution of
Schro¨dinger’s cats quite differently than the many-worlds approach. Let
|Live〉 and |Dead〉 represent states of the live and dead cat, and let |ND〉 and
|D〉 represent states of the nondecayed and decayed nucleus. The compound
system starts at t = 0 in the state |ND〉|Live〉. At time t, the state vector
has become
|ψ(t)〉 = e−αt|ND〉|Live〉+
√
1− e−2αt|D〉|Dead〉, (9)
where α−1 ln 2 is the nucleus’ half-life. In the present approach, (9) means
that the measure of worlds where the cat is dead continuously increases. In
the many-worlds approach, there must be a continuous split of the worlds
described by the first term on the right-hand side of (9), so as to constantly
increase the number of worlds described by the second term.
It can be argued that nonlocality is less of a problem in decoherence than
in many-worlds approaches. Referring to EPR-type experiments, Hewitt-
Horsman (2009, p. 888) concludes that
the second particle is still correlated with the first in neo-Everett,
and at first glance it would seem that some sort of non-local signal
is needed, to tell the worlds of the first particle how they join up
with the worlds of the second particle. This is indeed necessary
in those many world theories that have spatially extended worlds
that split instantaneously.
Butterfield (2001, p. 133) has pointed out the rather complex ontology of
Saunders’ and Wallace’s approach:
Saunders and Wallace conclude from these difficulties that we
should liberally accept resolutions of the universal quantum state
Ψ into an arbitrary basis—or at least an arbitrary basis that is a
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fine-graining of ‘the’ decoherence basis. In Wallace’s terminology
of ‘worlds,’ they consider continuously many bases (even if they
restrict themselves to bases that fine-grain ‘the’ decoherence ba-
sis), and so commit themselves to continuously many worlds [. . . ]
This is certainly a dizzying ontology. After all, each of these
continuously many worlds is ‘inhabited.’ Each world is not just a
component of a state (where states represent reality) but also has
a ‘system’ (albeit not an ordinary object!) actually in it. They
would still have continuously many worlds even if for each basis
they said—as they do not—that only one world is ‘inhabited.’
Kent (2010, p. 311) argues that the decoherence approach is close to the
many-minds approach:
[I]t seems to me [. . . ] that, at various points in their arguments,
Saunders, Wallace, Greaves–Myrvold and Papineau tacitly—and,
since they reject the many-minds interpretation, illegitimately—
appeal to many-minds intuitions. Indeed, at least in the first
three cases, it seems to me that if one fleshed their ideas out into a
fully coherent and complete interpretation, one would necessarily
arrive either at the many-minds interpretation or something even
worse.
But neither Saunders nor Wallace want to interpret multiplicity in terms of
many worlds or many minds. How then are they going to interpret it?
Let us focus on Wallace’s patterns and, for vividness, formulate the ques-
tion in terms of Schro¨dinger’s cat. Wallace claims that there is no contra-
diction in the simultaneous existence of the live cat and the dead cat. The
reason is that they both correspond to well-defined patterns in the universal
quantum state and that the two patterns are associated with vastly different
regions in configuration space. This is also what happens in classical the-
ory, where two different cats will always occupy vastly different regions in
configuration space.
But there is a crucial difference between classical patterns and patterns
in the universal state vector. In classical theory, two different cats will not
only occupy different regions in configuration space, but they will also oc-
cupy disjoint regions in three-dimensional space. That is, their projections
from configuration space to three-space will not overlap. This is not so with
Wallace’s patterns. Projected in three-space, the live cat may not only step
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on the dead cat’s tail, he may literally get into it. How can one understand
such multiplicity?
First note that, according to Wallace (2012, p. 40), “cats, or tables, or
any other such entities exist [. . . ] as structures within the underlying mi-
crophysics.” In principle, a cat could be described by applying molecular
dynamics to its constituent particles, but this is utterly impracticable as well
as not particularly illuminating. Higher-level structures such as organelles,
cells, tissues and organs can be useful to study different characteristics of a
cat. At the highest level, patterns elucidated by zoology and evolutionary
biology will help us understand, for instance, the hunting behavior of cats.
Whatever the relevance of studying each structure or pattern at its own
level, Wallace allows that cats are made of organs, organs of tissues, tissues
of cells, etc., all the way down to molecules and atoms. Let us focus for a
moment on the level of DNA molecules. These are rather well understood
from an atomic point of view, but mostly behave quasi-classically. Specifi-
cally, they are stable over long periods of time, witness the fact that even
prehistoric DNA can often be sequenced. Most importantly, DNA molecules
of Schro¨dinger’s cat are stable throughout the fate of the unfortunate animal.
So if the live cat and the dead cat are both real, each has its own DNA
molecules. Therefore as the experiment proceeds, there come to be twice as
many DNA molecules as before. The same remark also applies, it seems, to
the atomic constituents of DNA, but let us stick to DNA itself. The question
is, where in three-dimensional space are all these molecules?
One possible answer is to assume that the live cat and the dead cat, and
their associated DNA, don’t project from configuration space to the same
three-space. This is suggested, for instance, by Bacciagaluppi (2002, p. 118):
“[I]t should be possible to show that the total set of events will not fit into one
simple space-time, but into a branching space-time. The branching space-
time ought to be reconstructed from the causal structure of the decoherence
events.” This means that there is an added parameter, or another dimension,
introduced to distinguish different three-spaces from each other. It is hard to
see, however, what difference there is between this scheme and many worlds.
But this is not Wallace’s answer. According to him (2012, p. 311), there
is only one three-space into which both patterns project: “Other branches,
then, are located in precisely the same space and time as our own world;
it is just that they are dynamically incapable of (significantly) affecting our
world, and vice versa.” DNA molecules of the live and dead cats are, so
to speak, ghostlike to each other. More macroscopically, the live cat’s paw
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indeed gets into the dead cat’s tail, but he is entirely unaware of it. Or, as
Allori et al. put it:
Note that, by the linearity of the Schro¨dinger evolution, the live
cat and the dead cat, that ism1 andm2, do not interact with each
other, as they correspond to ψ1 and ψ2, which would in the usual
quantum theory be regarded as alternative states of the cat. The
two cats are, so to speak, reciprocally transparent. (2011, p. 7)
Metaphorically speaking, the universe according to Sf or Sm re-
sembles the situation of a TV set that is not correctly tuned, so
that one always sees a mixture of two channels. (2008, p. 379)
It is not clear how microphysics can be adapted for particles in the same
three-space to only selectively interact with each other.
Do we definitely have to choose between one three-space and many three-
spaces? Maybe not. Wilson (2011, p. 375) suggests that
the ‘spacetime’ of the quantum mechanics and quantum field the-
ory formalism, in terms of which branches are defined, is not
the same as the ‘spacetimes’ of macroscopic worlds. The former
‘spacetime’ is a single entity common to multiple branches, while
each of the latter ‘spacetimes’ is tied to a particular macroscopic
course of events.
The idea may be worth investigating, but its full implementation may not
be easily carried out.
I should note that not everyone agrees with Wallace on the reducibility,
in principle, of macroscopic structure to the underlying microphysics. In de-
veloping what they call ‘ontic structural realism,’ Ladyman and Ross (2007)
argue that structure is more real than objects, and that patterns at one level
are not made out of more fundamental objects. Can Everett’s approach be
formulated within this type of metaphysics? Maybe, but Ladyman and Ross
are not themselves advocates of Everett’s approach.
If one follows Saunders and accepts that actuality is relational, perhaps
then space itself is relational. Again, this would require new physics, since
both in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics and in quantum field theory, the
space-time arena is presupposed antecedently. Three-dimensional space can-
not be taken as emerging solely from the wave function, since all separable
Hilbert spaces are isomorphic.
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5 Discussion
After 50 years, there is no well-defined, generally agreed set of
assumptions and postulates that together constitute ‘the Everett
interpretation of quantum theory.’ (Kent, 2010, p. 310)
This assessment, I believe, has been substantiated in this paper with re-
spect to multiplicity: Are worlds physically splitting, or does the split hap-
pen only in the mind? Do worlds split locally or globally, instantaneously
or on some other space-time hypersurface? Are worlds generated upon any
entanglement-producing interaction, or only when macroscopic objects or ap-
paratus are involved? Do worlds split or bifurcate? Do they occupy the same
physical space-time or do they involve extra dimensions? These and others
are all questions on which different investigators disagree, or even questions
that have received different answers at different times from the same inves-
tigator. This, I should stress, is not meant as a charge of inconsistency,
since opinions and points of view naturally evolve in the course of research.
But it illustrates how long the road still is to a full clarification of Everett’s
interpretation.
I am much attracted by the so-called semantic view of theories which, as
far as quantum mechanics is concerned, construes interpretation as answering
the question “How can the world be for quantum mechanics to be true?”
From such a point of view, dealing with different consistent interpretations
of a theory provides clarification and understanding rather than confusion
(Marchildon 2004, 2009). There is no doubt that Everett’s relative states
approach constitutes a major contribution to the debate on the interpretation
of quantum mechanics. Every interpretation of quantum mechanics has its
shortcomings, since none has yet rallied general support. But in closing I
would like to stress a few problems that are perhaps more specific to Everett’s
theory.
The first problem is what has been documented here, that Everett’s the-
ory is not well defined. Such a charge can also be levelled at the Copenhagen
interpretation or at the Dirac–von Neumann collapse postulate. This is in
sharp contrast with the de Broglie–Bohm approach which, at least in the
nonrelativistic case, is precisely defined. I also believe that the more recent
approach of Quantum Bayesianism (Fuchs et al., 2014) is well defined, al-
though it has problems of its own (Marchildon, 2015). In all fairness, the de
Broglie–Bohm approach also has yet unsolved problems in the relativistic or
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field-theoretic case.
What I see as the second problem with Everett’s approach may well be
viewed as a virtue by its advocates: it is the fact that the approach stands or
falls with the exact validity of quantum mechanics. Add the smallest nonlin-
ear term to the Schro¨dinger equation, and Everett’s many worlds disappear
just like rings of smoke. The provisional status of fundamental theories sug-
gests that wide-ranging ontological claims should not depend on such strong
assumptions. By contrast, the de Broglie-Bohm approach is highly adaptable
to changes in the formalism of quantum mechanics (Valentini, 2010).
Finally, I cannot help comparing Everett’s extraordinary ontology with
other such wildly counter-intuitive instances in the history of thought. I have
in mind, for instance, Parmenides’ rejection of motion to match a theory of
being, or Berkeley’s rejection of matter to avoid the mind-body problem. In
experimental science, Carl Sagan’s motto that “Extraordinary claims require
extraordinary evidence” is a good methodological attitude. There is a lesson
to be drawn from this even if the interpretation of quantum mechanics goes
much beyond experiment. It seems to me that much skepticism about Ev-
erett’s approach and its many implementations stems from the fact that in
spite of valiant attempts (Deutsch, 1997), the strength of arguments in its
favor does not match the scope of its claim.
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